Security policy integration based on role-based access control model in healthcare collaborative environments by Teo, Poh Kuang & Ibrahim, Hamidah
 515 
 
Security Policy Integration based on Role-Based Access Control Model 
in Healthcare Collaborative Environments 
 
Teo Poh Kuang1, Hamidah Ibrahim2 
 
Faculty of Computer Science and Information Technology 
Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM) 







Recently research is focused on security policy 
integration and conflict reconciliation among various 
healthcare organizations. However, challenging security 
and privacy risks issues still arisen during sharing 
sensitive patient data in different large distributed 
organizations. In this paper, we proposed an approach 
for integrating security policies based on Role-Based 
Access Control (RBAC) policy model that supports 
dynamic constraint rules and meta data information, 
reduces policy redundancy and resolves conflicts based 
on the types of policy redundancy and conflict. We 
believe this work can support dynamic updates and 
control policies in collaborative environments. 
 
Keywords 
Security Policy Integration, Role-Based Access Control, 




Nowadays there are increasing needs for sharing data 
that contain personal information between different 
healthcare organizations Thus, there is a need for 
dynamic architectural in order to share data among 
different cross-organization in collaborative 
environments. However, often such data sharing may 
contain personal sensitive and confidential information 
about patient, such as family composition and DNA. It 
remains a challenge to ensure security and privacy issues 
for such data sharing in collaborative environment 
(Jurczyk & Xiong, 2008).  
 
Security is concerns on confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of patient data. Privacy typically concerns 
the patient right to keep their personal medical records. 
Thus, security can be seen as a key to privacy, as a 
necessary condition to assure it. Security privacy access 
control focuses on data sharing in cross-organization. 
Data sharing will carry out the integration policy among 
different cross-organization collaboration since each 
organization may specify its own security policies 
independently. Policy integration is a process to integrate 
the similarity security policies from the participating 
organization in order to govern the data sharing 
throughout the collaborations. The detection and 
resolution of policy redundancy and conflict are 
important to achieve availability, confidentiality, and 
integrity in policy integration process.  
 
During the policy integration phase, the policies from 
different organizations to collaborate are compared and 
evaluated through similarity and logical reasoning before 
the organizations engage in collaborative environment. 
Various redundancy and inconsistencies between access 
policies from different healthcare units may occur during 
integration process. The policy redundancy and conflict 
resolution are important to resolve redundancy and 
inconsistencies before security policies can be integrated 
for healthcare collaboration.  
 
Access control policy model is important to support 
dynamic set of users since the group of collaboration 
organizations may join or leave at runtime (He & Yang, 
2009). Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model has 
been widely investigated and applied to various 
applications for a period of time (Hung & Zheng, 2007). 
However, dynamic constraints in RBAC model have 
been neglected by existing approaches. This cannot 
guarantee the flexible security privacy policies for 
dynamic updates and control policies.  
 
In this paper, we proposed an approach for integrating 
security policies based on RBAC policy model 
considering both dynamic constraints and meta data 
information. Besides that, an approach to filter and 
collect only the required policies from different 
organizations based on user’s integration requirements is 
investigated. It is important for us to resolve policy 
redundancy and conflicts based on the types of policy 
redundancy and conflicts. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides 
the security policy specification and presents a case 
study that is used through out this paper. The types of 
policy redundancy and conflict are also discussed in 
Section 2. Related works are presented in Section 3. 
Section 4 presents the proposed approach for policy 
integration process based on RBAC model in healthcare 
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The security policy (SPL) in our work is defined as 
follows: 
SPL= (R, CR, P, C), 
where R is role, CR is credential, P is permission and is 
defined as a pair <M, O>, where M is an operation mode 
and O is an object of data (Park & Lee, 2007), and C is 
constraint. Constraint information that is included in the 
policy is temporal and spatial contexts, and meta data 
information. 
 
The following case study is used to present how policies 
integration process worked through our proposed 
approach. This case study is a modified version of the 
case study given in Yau & Chen (2008). Assume that 
three organizations that are university, pharmaceutical 
company, and medical center intend to collaborate. Also, 
assume that the following security policies have been 
specified. 
 
Organization A – University 
 Policy U1 = {Professor, Professor_ID, Access ∪      
             Update, Unpublished Paper Draft,    
(09:00 to 18:00 ∪ Other_Time) ∈ 
Temporal, Inner_Office ∈ Spatial,  
Y ∈ Privacy-Sensitive}  
 
Policy U2 = {Graduate_Assistant, Assistant_ID, Access,  
Unpublished Paper Draft, 
(09:00 to 18:00) ∈ Temporal,  
Inner_Office ∈ Spatial,  
Y∈ Privacy-Sensitive} 
 
Policy U3 = {Professor, Professor _ID, Access,  
Patient Information at collaborative 
medical center, (09:00 to 18:00) ∈ 
Temporal, (Inner_Office ∪ Outer_Office) 
∈ Spatial,Y∈ Privacy-Sensitive} 
 
Organization B - Pharmaceutical Company 
Policy P1 = {(Scientist ∪ Directors), 
(Scientist_ID ∪ Director_ID), Access, 
Trial Participants List,  
(09:00 to 18:00) ∈Temporal, 
Inner_Office ∈ Spatial,  
Y∈ Privacy-Sensitive} 
Policy P2 = {Director, Director_ID, Update,  
       Trial Participants List,  
                     (09:00 to 18:00) ∈ Temporal, 
                      Inner_Office ∈ Spatial,  
                      Y∈ Privacy-Sensitive} 
 
Organization C - Medical Center 
Policy M1 = {Senior_Doctor, Senior_Doctor_ID,  
        Forward, Patient Information,  
        (09:00 to 18:00) ∈ Temporal,  
    (Inner_Office ∪ Outer_Office) ∈ Spatial, 
    Y∈ Privacy-Sensitive} 
Policy M2 = {(Senior_Doctor ∪ Junior_Doctor),  
(Senior_Doctor_ID ∪ Junior_Doctor_ID), 
Access, Patient Information,  
(09:00 to 18:00) ∈ Temporal, 
(Inner_Office ∪ Outer_Office) ∈ Spatial, 
Y∈ Privacy-Sensitive} 
 
Policy M3 = {Professor_University at collaborative  
university, Professor _ID,  
Access, Patient Information,  
(09:00 to 18:00) ∈ Temporal,  
Inner_Office ∈ Spatial, 
Y∈ Privacy-Sensitive} 
 
Types of Policy Redundancy and Conflict 
There are several types of policy redundancy and conflict 
identified in our work. In this paper, the terms conflict 
and inconsistencies are used interchangeably. 
 
(a) Types of Redundancy 
Policy redundancy is defined as unnecessary access 
control rules that exists when policies from different 
organizations are compared during policy integration 
process. Types of redundancy that are included in our 
work are redundancy between roles, redundancy between 
credentials, redundancy between permissions, 
redundancy between temporal and spatial constraints, 
and redundancy between meta data information. 
 
(b) Types of Conflict 
The types of inconsistencies considered in our work are 
role inconsistencies, credential inconsistencies, 
permission inconsistencies, constraint inconsistencies, 
and meta data information inconsistencies. 
 
Role Inconsistencies: Role inconsistencies between 
policies from different organizations are present when 
there are roles in one that have no comparable roles in 
the other. For example, organization A might name 
attribute role of professor as “Professor” to access patient 
information but organization C would name the attribute 
role of professor as “Professor_University”.  
 
Credential Inconsistencies: Credential inconsistencies 
are identified when two organizations have different 
requirements on what needs to be established before the 
permissions associated with a role can be accessed. This 
could mean that equivalent roles in the two organizations 
have access to similar permissions but with a less 
stringent authorization requirement in one organization.  
 
Permission Inconsistencies: Inconsistencies in the 
permission occur when organizations allocate different 
permission to comparable roles. Such an inconsistency 
means that when comparable roles have no equivalent 
permission between different organizations. This 
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inconsistency indicates that when a role in organization 
A has different rights to access permission than the 
comparable role in organization B. 
Table 1: Analysis of Characteristics of the Approaches Proposed by Previous Works 
 


























Security Policy Specifications  √     √  √ √ 
Policy Integration Process  √       √  
Policy Comparison   √ √ √ √   √ √ 
Policy Inconsistencies Checking   √  √ √   √  
Policy Inconsistencies 
Reconciliation 
  √  √    √  
Policy Redundancy Checking      √     
Encryption & Decryption          √
Types of Policy Redundancy      √     
Type of Collaboration Patterns   √ √ √      
Types of Policies    √       
Constraints Information √ √    √ √ √   
Data Flow between Organizations  √         
Critically Aware  √          
Types of Policy Inconsistencies   √  √ √     
RBAC Policy  √ √ √ √ √ √ √   
Role Provisioning       √    
Privacy Preserving Concerns √      √   √
Data Integration Process          √
Query Plan Wrapper          √
Query Plan Executor          √
 
 
Temporal and Spatial Constraint Inconsistencies: 
Temporal and spatial constraint inconsistencies occur 
when the location and time of the user to access 
information does not satisfy the temporal and spatial 
constraints of comparable role. For example, a professor 
in organization A can access the patient information at 
collaborative medical center between 09:00 to 18:00 
whenever professor he is in the inner office or outer 
office. While for organization C, patient information can 
be accessed by a professor at collaborative university 
when he is at inner office between 09:00 to 18:00.  
 
Meta Data Inconsistencies: Meta data inconsistencies 
are identified when the level of sensitivity in one 
organization is different from the other organization for 
the comparable roles.  
 
3.0 RELATED WORK 
 
Yau & Yin (2009) developed an approach that can 
collect only the required policies based on user’s 
integration requirements and requests for collaboration. 
Ahamed et al. (2007) presented two possible privacy 
violations: unwanted health information disclosure and 
prevention of information leakage through context 
information to meet the challenges towards preserving 
privacy on pervasive healthcare environment. The 
elementary security and reliability requirements 
discussed in Matousek (2008) should be evaluated in our 
work in order to make sure that the probability of 
occurrence and level possible damage can be estimated. 
 
Chi et al. (2008) investigated the workflow involvement 
of healthcare process in order to support and complement 
the transition of information and tasks among different 
 
healthcare organizations. The purpose of this study is to 
propose a security access control model based on role-
based access control for integrating healthcare 
information systems of various organizations. This work 
only extended RBAC model with role hierarchy, may not 
encompass the overall context associated with 
collaboration environment. This is not sufficient to 
guarantee that the privacy of patient information can be 
protected during data sharing in collaboration 
environment. Thus, there is a need to have cohesive 
policies to sensitive personal health information 
(Meingast et al., 2006). A case study among pharmacies, 
hospitals and clinics is presented in this work. However, 
their implementation is in a relatively small number of 
organizations. 
 
There are a few previous works that use description logic 
reasoner to prove that two policies are suitable, or not 
suitable, for collaboration purposes. However, 
description logic used in these previous works cannot 
deal with meta data information (He et al., 2009). Park & 
Lee (2007) proposed a secure and intelligent Patient 
Information Service (PIS) based on Context Constraint 
Role-Based Access Control (CC-RBAC) in the next 
generation hospital considering ubiquitous intelligent 
environment. This work presents an access control 
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mechanism by using temporal and spatial context 
information to patient information. Temporal context 
information classifies time into two types - doctor’s 
regular working time and other time. While spatial 
context information classifies location into three spaces - 
inner medical office, outer medical office in hospitals, 
and the other places. However, this work only focuses on 
access control in single organization, access control in 
order to integrate security policies and conflict 
reconciliation for collaboration environment has not been 
well studied.  
 
Martino et al. (2008) proposed a multi-domain supported 
and privacy-aware role based access control to meet 
three crucial requirements when accessing Electronic 
Medical Records (EMR): access must be both secure and 
privacy preserving, access must be allowed to 
individuals from different organizations, and access 
could be confined based on meta information of the 
EMRs. Data profile that is proposed in this work is the 
mechanism provided in extended P-RBAC to store and 
manage meta data information. Meta data information 
currently included in data profiles in this work are: data-
category, creator-name, creator-affiliation, date-of 
creation or valid-to, and privacy-sensitive (Y/N). 
 
A number of studies concentrated on the different types 
of collaborations between organizations have been 
conducted. The analysis from these studies shows that 
different types of collaboration impose different ways of 
integration (He et al., 2009; He & Yang, 2009; He & 
Yang, 2007). Although these studies focused on business 
collaboration, they provide simple case studies on the 
more practical issues in healthcare domain. The goal of 
these research works is to identify security policies that 
belong to different application domains and provide 
analysis on authorization policy requirements for 
business collaboration, collaboration patterns and various 
security comparability and integration issues. 
Description logic that is encoded in these works can be 
used to determine the satisfiability of a concept. 
However, these studies only focus on policy consistency 
comparison and evaluation rather than policy integration 
process in collaborative environments. Besides that, 
these models have limitation, only some of the policy 
inconsistencies have been encoded in this authorization 
policy model. In addition, they did not investigate policy 
redundancy that may exist between policies. Policy 
conflict reconciliation according to the types of 
collaboration patterns in these works is also intractable. 
 
Huang et al. (2009) identified the types of redundancy 
and inconsistency during the policy redundancy and 
inconsistency checking. The policy checking algorithm 
works in a wide variety of environments ranging from 
small to large organization, with a few to a large number 
of roles and comprising of complex access control 
constraints.  However, this study did not look at conflict 
reconciliation and security policy integration process of 
different organization collaborations. This work only 
focuses on static RBAC constraints during the policy 
checking process and thus dynamic RBAC constraints 
have been neglected. 
 
Yau & Chen (2008) presented an approach to security 
policies integration including a similarity-based policy 
adaption algorithm for changing collaborative groups 
and a negotiation-based policy generation protocol for 
the new resources generated by the collaboration as well 
as for conflict reconciliation. A similarity-based policy 
adaption algorithm and negotiation-based policy 
generation protocol are used to achieve dynamic security 
policy integration with minimum human intervention, 
which is related to our research. However, no details are 
given about how to generate the new security policy after 
conflict reconciliation. Negotiation-base conflict 
reconciliation proposed in this work take situation-aware 
compromise thresholds, which specify how much 
compromise an organization is willing to make for a 
specific collaboration during the conflict reconciliation 
process. The compromise makes between the 
participating organizations usually depends on the trust 
relations among them. This conflict reconciliation 
process selects weaker policy that cannot promise actual 
minimal damage that will bring to the participating 
organizations. Besides that, similarity-based security 
policy integration algorithm is limited to two 
organizations’ policies similarity analysis.  
 
Based on the above previous works, none of the 
approaches focus on the issues of integrating security 
policies based on RBAC policy model considering both 
dynamic constraints and meta data information. Thus, 
our work discussed RBAC issues under collaborative 
context, role hierarchy, separation of duty, and 
cardinality constraints and meta data information in 
collaboration environment to further guarantee the 
consistency policy integration will operate smoothly in 
multi-domain environment. It is necessary for us to carry 
out a larger, yet feasible, implementation that will 
provide the scenario required for a more comprehensive 
e-Healthcare system.  Table 1 shows an analysis of 
characteristics of the approaches proposed by previous 
works. 
 
4.0 THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
 
Our approach aims at generating a new integrated 
security policy set among different healthcare 
organizations in collaborations. The following describes 
our proposed approach which consists of three phases, 
namely: filteration phase, policy comparison checking 
phase, and new policy generation phase. Figure 1 shows 
our overall approach for policy integration, redundancy 
resolution and conflict resolution based on RBAC model 






4.1 Filteration Phase 
 
Each organization may specify its own security policies 
independently. Policy filteration filters the policies from 
those organizations that are related and required based on 
organization’s collaboration before the organizations 
engage in collaboration.  
 
Example, let say professor from the university intends to 
access the trial participants list at pharmaceutical 
company. However, the trial participants list is provided 
by medical center to pharmaceutical company. After the 
collaboration request is submitted by university, 
pharmaceutical company, and medical center to 
collaborate, the filteration phase will filter and find the 
related and required policies from these three 
organizations based on the request. Thus, only policies 
U3, P1, and M3 are considered in policy integration 
process after policy filteration phase.  
 
4.2 Policy Comparison Checking Phase 
It is a challenging task to generate the global similarity 
policy for collaboration purposes since each organization 
may specify its own security policies. Policy comparison 
checking is important and necessary phase during policy 
integration process. There are two types of policy 
checking which are policy redundancy checking and 
policy conflict checking. The types of policy redundancy 
are identified in policy redundancy checking. The main 
purpose of policy redundancy is to ensure that there are 
no redundant specifications in describing the integrated 
policies. The redundancy resolution resolves the policy 
redundancy based on the types of redundancy. Example, 
referring to the previous case study, policies U3 and M3 
cause policy redundancy. The types of redundancy exist 
between these two policies are credential redundancy, 
permission redundancy, and meta data redundancy. 
Redundancy resolver resolves the redundancy policy 
between policies U3 and M3 by removing policy U3. 
 
The consistency of access policies of different 
organizations needs to be evaluated. Therefore, 
collaborations can reveal the inconsistencies between the 
participating policies. The type of conflicts is identified 
after a policy checking reveals that policy inconsistencies 
exist between the organizations. Policy consistency 
checking compares all possible similarities based on 
relationship between the policies. Policies comparison 
can be classified into four possible ways that are: they 
can be exactly matching to one another; one can be 
inclusively matching with others if one can be a subset of 
the other, and one can be correlated with others if some 
components from one may occur in the other while still 
retaining some unique features, or one is disjoint with the 
other if they could be completely different with no 
overlap.  
  
The policies between different organizations are 
considered permitted if they are exactly matching to one 
another. Otherwise, policy inconsistency exists between 
policies. If the conflict reconciliation cannot resolve the 
policy conflict, then the request for collaboration 
between organizations is rejected. 
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Figure 1: Overall Approach for Policy Integration, 
Redundancy Resolution, and Conflict Resolution based on 
RBAC Model 
 
For example, policy U3 states that a professor is allowed 
to access patient information at collaborated medical 
center from 09:00 to 18:00 when he is at inner office or 
outer office. However, policy M3 states that a professor 
from collaborated university can only access patient 
information on regular working hour from 09:00 to 18:00 
and at inner office. Thus, there are inconsistencies 
between policies U3 and M3 that are temporal and spatial 

























M3 is more restricted than policy U3. Conflict resolver 
resolves the conflict based on the types of conflict that 
are identified.  
 
From the above example, it is desirable to enforce 
restricted access policies in order to achieve 
confidentiality of patient information by restricting the 
access only at inner office from 09:00 to 18:00. Thus, we 
remove policy U3 and maintain policy M3 since policy 
M3 is more restricted than policy U3.  It seems like there 
is no direct relationship between policies P1 and M3. 
However, because policy M3 at medical center allows 
professor from collaborative university to access patient 
information, thus it is reasonable to grant permission to 
professor to access trial participant list at pharmaceutical 
company that is provided by medical center.  
 
4.3 New Policy Generation Phase  
 
Finally, the new security policy set is generated for the 
collaborating organizations. Our access control model is 
enforced with privacy policies to ensure that we can meet 
the security and privacy purposes for data sharing. It is 
important to generate a common set of policies accepted 
by different organizations. Hence, the integrated security 
policy set should be able to handle all possible data 
access requests by users from different organizations in 
collaborations which address the security concerns from 
different organizations.  Example, referring to the case 
study, the final security policy set based on the user’s 
collaboration request is as follows: 
 
Final Policy = {Professor, Professor_ID, Access,  
           Trial Participants List,  
           (09:00 to 18:00)∈ Temporal,  
           Inner_Office ∈ Spatial,  




To briefly summary, we proposed an approach for 
integrating security policies based on Role-Based Access 
Control (RBAC) policy model considering both dynamic 
constraints and meta information. Besides that, an 
approach to filter and collect only the required policies 
from different organizations based on user’s integration 
requirements is investigated. It is important for us to 
resolve policy redundancy and conflicts based on the 
types of policy redundancy and conflict. The next stage 
of our work is to prove the correctness and completeness 
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